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The Rhetoric of Self-Deprecation 
in Montaigne's Essais 
Although it may seem far-fetched to draw com-
parisons between Michel de Montaigne's Essais and 
the twentieth-century French nouveau roman, the two 
do have certain elements in common if one considers,. 
the question of form and the role of the reader. In 
the nouveau roman, for example, virtually all the 
structural principles which traditionally determine 
the shape of the novel are undermined, thus creating 
the illusion of an unfinished product that the reader 
is induced to complete. The writer's purpose in 
part is to engage the reader in the creative process; 
should he f ail to do so, the nov el would not "work." 
Confusion and uneasiness seem to be the inevitable 
consequences of the reader's active role in bridging 
the gaps left by the novelist. 
Likewise, the essay provides a dynamic frame-
work within which both the writer and his reader 
can interact freely. Frederick Rider, author of 
Psychological Development in the Essays of Michel 
de Montaigne, characterizes i t as an "easy" form 
requiring "no sus tained effort". on the part of the 
wri ter, thereby "allowing him to choose his own 
time, topic, and approach"; it is "informal, or 
could easily be made to seem so .•.. 111 Anyone 
who has read even a f ew of the essays will recognize 
that Montaigne is as interes ted in examining himself 
as he is the topics indicated by his titles. His 
essays appear to exude a certain nonchalance; they 
give us the impression of an aimless wandering of 
his thoughts as he scrutinizes himself his own 
opinions and those "qui sont en usage"2 (which are 
usually the target of much of his criticism), as 
well as philosophical, political and social ques-
tions, from every possible angle. He expands only 
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to contract, obscures only to elucidate, and all the 
while constrains the reader to do the same. 
Montaigne's choice of the essay as his genre 
was undoub tedly a reac tian to the "sec dogmatisme" 3 
of his predecessors against which he protests so 
frequently. By constantly digressing and changing 
perspective he is able to break out of that rigid 
mold and foster interaction with his reader. Ian 
Winter, in Montaigne's Self-Portrait and its Influ-
ence in France, 1580-1630, contends tha t "Montaigne 
is, by his own admission, indirect and devious when 
i t cornes to the overall structure of the essay," 
suggesting that Montaigne's digressiveness is "highly 
supportive of spontaneity in self-portraiture. u4 
Although Montaigne constantly insists that 11 je n'ai 
pas corrigé . . . par force de la raison mes comple-
xions naturelles, et n'ai aucunement troublé par art 
mon inclination. Je me laisse aller, comme je suis 
venu ... " (III, 12, 426), most critics agree that 
his essays were reworked and corrected as well as 
expanded. Rider s ta tes tha t "In his efforts to 
better express the truth, Montaigne does not shun 
either careful revisions or stylistic flourishes" 
(Rider, 103). But by understating his skill as an 
artist, he remains at the "human" level and conse-
quently becomes more creditable. 
The true challenge for the reader lies in 
dealing with the fragmentation of the self-portrait 
and of the subjects being treated, and in recon-
ciling the many Montaignes within each individual 
essay. Wolfgang Iser describes the relationship 
between writer and reader in his book The Implied 
Reader, explaining that the writer must "activate 
the reader's imagination in order to involve him and 
realize the intentions of his text, 11 5 and further-
more, that "one of the most potent weapons in the 
writer 's armory is illusion" (Iser, 284). While 
such comments may seem more applicable to modern 
works of fiction that lend themselves to reader-
response criticism, the concept also works for 
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Montaigne, for deception plays a major role in the 
Essais. The persona presented in the essays is re-
gularly undercut by another self that Montaigne is 
striving to reveal. If there is some "activation" 
of the reader 's imagination, then its source must 
be found in this opposition. 
Such is the literary paradox in Montaigne's 
work: the "personal, egotistical element is strong in 
the self-portrait, yet intensive efforts are made to 
gain, or to appear to gain, obj ec tivity" (Win ter, 15). 
The principal method by which Montaigne attempts to 
achieve this unbiased demeanor is self-deprecation. 
It is difficult not to notice its presence, especially 
in light of its heavy concentration in the first few 
paragraphs of many of the essays. An initial reading 
of these essays certainly will reveal one of the faces 
of Montaigne: the honest, overly-sensitive down-to-
earth Montaigne whose self-esteem seems uncommonly 
low and who apparent.ly has absolutely nothing to 
flaunt. A closer reading, however, should divulge 
another side of the persona: the intelligent, self-
conscious, analytical Montaigne who is confident 
that in admitting his weaknesses, he will reveal his 
strength of character. By appearing to be unbiased he 
he hopes to gain the reader's trust and cooperation; 
by continually frustrating our image of him, he 
immerses us in the relentless analysis of himself 
and of mankind. He camouflages the persona of 
strength and firm belief with a veil of modesty and 
weakness. By examining the preface and the begin~ 
nings of two essays, "Des Menteurs" and "De l'Insti-
tution des enfants," we will see how the interaction 
between the "faces" of Montaigne ultirnat:ely disturbs 
the reader 's perception of the wri ter and of the 
intent of his book.6 
Montaigne's first sentence in his preface, 
"C'est ici un livre de bonne foi, lecteur" (20) 
in effect exemplifies his attitude toward his rea-
der, for among his aims is that of convincing us 
that what he writes is the truth, that what we will 
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see portrayed is the real, natural Montaigne, "tout 
entier, et tout nu" (20). Rider comments that "the 
motive force of his style is precisely the desire 
to be believed" (Rider, 97). It follows, then, that 
if Montaigne seeks to paint a true-to-lif e portrait, 
he must incorpora te both his weaknesses and his 
strengths. He apparently feels that in order to be 
believed, he must underscore his flaws, his "human-
ness," for if he painted an immaculate portrait, his 
work would lose verisimilitude, which would in turn 
reduce his power to influence the reader. In the 
preface -he insists almost immediately that "je ne 
m'y suis proposé aucune fin que domestique et privée. 
Je n'y ai eu nulle considération de ton service, ni 
de ma gloire" (20), and that his book is destined 
only for those relatives and friends who might wish 
to remember "aucuns traits de mes conditions et hu-
meurs" (20). He would like us to believe that a 
"public" neither exis ts nor concerns him, swearing 
that his powers "ne sont pas capables d'un tel 
dessein" (20), affirming that "Si c'eût été pour 
rechercher la faveur du monde, je me fusse mieux 
paré et me présenterais en une marche étudiée" (20). 
Ins tead of s tating wha t he really wants to say, "je 
ne recherche pas la faveur du monde," he uses the 
pluperf ect subjunctive and the si clause construc-
tion to suggest that the situation is contrary to 
fact. We are supposed to take Montaigne's word 
that nothing about his character will be disguised; 
moreover, his defects "s'y liront au vif" (20). 
This technique of self-reduction tightens the bond 
between Montaigne and his reader. The Essais re-
present not an autobiography dedicated to posterity, 
but a conscious, though subtle, "essay" to establish 
his value by lauding his imperfections. 
Henri Peyre, in Literature and Sincerity, 
discusses Montaigne's awareness of the dialectical 
process of thought, stating that Montaigne 
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realized that some passiveness 
was required from him who claimed 
to s tudy himself in his becoming, 
or else too much activity, too 
conscious a use of will power 
would transf orm and def orm the 
object observed by the subject. 
At the same time, Montaigne un-
ders tood that a searching self-
analysis is a corroding agent, 
whittling away many illusions and 
delusions. He strove for sorne 
equilibrium, and he justified his 
desire for sincerity through his 
purpose as a moralist. The dilemma 
was for him whether to stress all 
that in him was mediocre or base, 
so as to be eas ily content wi th 
his own, and man's, imperfections, 
or to depict himself as sornewhat 
nobler than he was, so as to 
attempt aiming higher and thus 
to improve others.7 
The advantage of Montaigne's decision to highlight 
his mediocri ty is this: we, as readers, can identify 
with imperfection much more easily than with flaw-
lessness. Montaigne resolves the dilemma described 
by Peyre by relying on reverse psychology; by at-
ternpting to prove how ignoble he is, he will ulti-
mately prove his nobility. What àppears to be 
excessive rnodesty is merely a ploy which a close 
exarnination of his style will betray. As Alfred 
Clauser puts it in Montaigne Paradoxal, "Ses mo-
desties affectées sont des modesties créatrices. 
Le doute sur soi-même prend corps et renverse le 
doute. 118 If Montaigne were being honest about his 
intentions concerning the Essais, if he really did 
want to leave an explanation of his character to 
his friends and family, then a closing staternent 
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like "Ce n'est pas raison que tu emploies ton loisir 
en un sujet si frivole et si vain" (20) would be un-
necessary. Such an unobtrusive statement put so well 
only challenges the attentive reader to forge ahead, 
not to toss the book aside. If he believes that 
claim, then he probably. also believes Montaigne when 
he claims to be "sans contention et artifice" (20). 
The separation of truth from illusion is by far the 
most complex and intriguing aspect of the reading 
process. 
Wayne Booth quotes François Mauriac's state-
ment that "an author who assures you that he writes 
for himself alone and that he does not care whether 
he is heard or not is a boaster and is deceiving 
ei ther himself or you. 11 9 In tru th Montaigne do es 
have something he considers signif icant to declare 
to the world.10 Structurally speaking, self-depre-
cation at the beginning of the essay enables Mon-
taigne to establish an easygoing, congenial rapport 
with his reader, so that his expression of moral 
judgments, which intensifies as the essay progresses, 
often goes unnoticed by the unsuspecting reader. In 
terms of style, we will see that Montaigne is almost 
constantly contradicting himself, so that the reader 
has difficulty knowing what to believe about the 
writer's knowledge and reliability. Barbara Bowen 
discusses these characteristics of the essays at 
length, assuring us that Montaigne's 
constant self-denigration 
has a sound moral pretext--if we 
are led to sympathize with him, 
we shall be more likely to accept 
his moral outlook. Ambiguity 
arises only when we f ail to dis-
tinguish between his attitude 
to the problem discussed, which 
is invariably quite straight-
forward, and his attitude to the 
reader, which is often falsely 
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humble and self-deprecating. 
He of ten, in fact, deliberately 
deceives the reader rather than 
merely disconcerts him.11 
Thus the reader is lef t to wander in a labyrinth, 
never sure whether to trust or to doubt. 
The technique of affected modesty is hardly 
one of Montaigne's inventions. According to Ernst 
Robert Curtius, author of European Literature and the 
Latin Middle Ages, it was frequently used by Roman 
orators in their exordia to put their listeners in 
a "favÎrable, attentive, and tractable stat'e of 
mind." 2 Su ch modes ty f ormulae were la ter adop ted 
during pagan and Christian Late Antiquity and appear 
in medieval Latin and vernacular literature (Curtius, 
83). The use of a mask enables f~e writer to manipu-
late the reaction of the reader. Montaigne, too, 
strives for his reader's acceptance by building a 
protective wall of self-deprecation around himself; 
he even admits in a later essay that "La confession 
généreuse et libre énerve le reproche et désarme 
! 'injure" (III, 9, 395). It is also an invaluable 
rhetorical device. Once Montaigne has submerged the 
reader in his subjectivity, he can then slip easily 
into a more objective mode and express his ideas on 
a particular subject. 
Numerous .critics have elaborated upon Mon-
taigne' s unpretentious attitude, and some have even 
labeled it false. But f ew have examined the text of 
a specific essay closely ·enough to speculate as to 
what makes it deceptive. In opening "Des Menteurs," 
for example, Montaigne sets out to prove that he is 
unique by demonstrating harsh self-criticism: ' "Il 
n'est homme à qui il sièse si mal de se mêler de par-
ler de mémoire. Car je n'en reconnais quasi trace 
en moi, et ne pense qu'il y en ait au monde une autre 
si monstrueuse en défaillance" (30). The accumula-
tion of negations and the adjective "monstrueuse" 
enable him to destroy any confidence we may have had 
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in Montaigne's ability to remember. Yet it also 
makes us realize that this is a man who knows himself 
well and who is daring enough to show his reader the 
negative side of hi.s personality. Our acknowledge-
ment of that fact somehow brightens the dark portrait 
he has .ostensibly begun to paint. By stating that 
"je n'en reconnais quasi trace en moi" he is also 
affirming his cognizant capabilities; he is able to 
recognize that he does not recognize, as it were. 
Likewise, strategically placed at the end of the 
opening paragraph we f ind "Mais en cet te-là je pense 
être singulier et très raie, et digne de gagner par 
là nom et réputation" (30). Thus, though he is 
"mons trous" in terms of his memory, he is at the same 
time superior and rare, worthy of our consideration 
rather than our repudiation. By denouncing himself, 
he manages to indirectly praise himself, or, as 
Glauser puts it, "S'il admet un manque, il affirme 
en même temps une vertu, celle qui consiste à avouer 
ce manque" (Glauser, 39). Peyre likens Montaigne's 
point of view to that of Rousseau, explaining that 
almost as much as Rousseau, albeit 
with keener humor, he considered 
himself as unique and took pride in 
it. Unweariedly he recurred to the 
strangeness that he detected in him-
self and to the puzzle that, to 
others as well as to himself, he 
was bound to constitute. Stressing 
that strange uniqueness, however, 
can corne perilously close to boast-
fulness . . . (Peyre, 39). 
Only by reverting to self-deprecation can Montaigne 
prevent himself from breaking the equilibrium that he 
must maintain. 
The second paragraph begins by reiterating the 
the idea of a suffering Montaigne, whose "inconvénient 
naturel" (30) is out of his control. Soon thereaf ter, 
we see the other sicle of the coin, the knowledgeable 
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Montaigne, who feels capable of judging Plato 
("Plato a raison ..• ") as well as the notion that 
he who lacks in sense must likewise lack in memory. 
The juxtaposition of this appraisal and the preceding 
criticism of his memory would logically lead the 
reader to conclude that Montaigne, must, therefore, 
have no sense. He subsequently disproves this, how-
ever, blaming them (those unnamed others) for misread-
ing him. He uses "comme si" with the imperfect to 
strike down any doubt about his judgmental capabili-
ties ("comme si je m'accusais d'être insensé ... ") 
(30). For Montaigne there is a clear distinction 
between "mémoire et entendement," but not for those 
whom he accuses; it is they who "me font tort," for 
"il se voit par expérience"--he must be a wise and 
experienced man--"que les mémoires excellentes se 
joignent volontiers aux jugements débiles" (30). It 
is up to the reader to f ill in the gaps and conclude 
that Montaigne's judgment must be excellent, given 
what he has told us about his memory. 
The def ensive tone continues throughout this 
paragraph, as Montaigne attempts to clarify his po-
sition with respect to his enemies. He reveals their 
presumed perception of him by visualizing himself 
through their eyes, referring to himself repeatedly 
in the third persan. By repeatïng the subject pronoun 
"il" at the beginning of a series of choppy sentences, 
he is able bath to mock and to defy their unfounded 
accusations: "Il a oublié, dit-on, cette prière ou 
cette promesse. Il ne se souvient point de ses amis. 
Il ne s'est point souvenu de dire, ou faire, ou taire 
cela pour l'amour de moi" (30). The echo of the 
conjunction "ou" also emphasizes the scope of their 
insinuations. Montaigne proffers a stylistic dis-
play of power here that seems quite foreign to the 
lamenting passivity that dominated the first f ew 
sentences of the essay. He has abandoned self-cri-
ticism in order to blame someone else. 
Montaigne increasingly tells us what he is not; 
he is no t, for example, blinded by ambition, "un mal 
pire qui se fût facilement produit en moi" (30), but 
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which was not produced in him, for he is unique. 
Wh ile nature has neglected to ref ine his memory, she 
has strengthened other faculties. Montaigne reverses 
the cri ticism of his memory by s tating tha t if he had 
been able to remember the ideas of others, his judg-
ment might have waned, following "couchant et alan-
guissant ... sur les traces d'autrui, connue fait le 
monde." He has thus elevated himself above "le monde" 
while affirming that a f eeble memory is not at all a 
negative quality. His speech is "plus court, car le 
magasin de la mémoire est .volontiers plus fourni de 
matière que n'est celui de l'invention; si elle m'eût 
tenu bon, j'eusse assourdi tous mes amis de babil" 
(30). Once again we find that criticizing other 
men's memories which are burdened by superfluous de-
tails permits Montaigne to praise himself, and we 
almost forget our initial perception of his mon-
strosity. What we must extract from this image-la-
den passage is that since Montaigne's memory is not 
good, he do es not deaf en his friends "de babil. "It 
is they, rather, who misuse their memories and 
"reculent si arrière leur narration et la chargent 
de vaines circonstances que si le conte est bon ils 
en étouffent la bonté" ( 30) . It is ironie to no te, 
too, that in condoning brevity and directness of 
speech, Montaigne creates one of the most lyrical, 
dynamic (considering the abundance of active verbs) 
passages in the entire essay. The resurgence of 
Montaigne the poet once again widens the gap between 
theory and practice. 
This particular passage also marks a turning 
point in the movement of the essay; henceforth i t 
becomes more and more didactic in tone. A moralizing 
Montaigne emerges and gradually supplants the intro-
spective, self-critical Montaigne who dominated the 
beginning of the essay. Now he sets himself up as 
an expert on the subject of lying, emphasizing his 
broad experience in interpreting the actions of man-
kind, and stating on several occasions, for example 
"De quoi j'ai souvent vu l'expérience ... " (31), 
and "J'ai vu plusieurs de mon temps . . . " (31), and 
24 
"Je trouve qu'on s'amuse ordinairement à châtier aux 
enfants . . . " (31) as well as making bold philoso-
phical judgments which seem to reflect general truths 
about life and human behavior: "En vérité, le mentir 
est un maudit vice. Nous ne sommes hommes, et ne nous 
tenons les uns les autres que par la parole" (31) and 
"La menterie seule, et, un peu au-dessous, l 'opiniâ-
treté, me semble être celles desquelles on devrait à 
toute instance combattre la naissance et le progrès" 
(31). Montaigne and all mindful readers should arm 
themselves to def end truth--a noble but ironie at-
titude in light of Montaigne's own paradoxical style. 
The accumulation of so many absolute academic 
statements in the latter part of the essay will surely 
convince the reader of Montaigne's hatred of lying, 
and thus increase his credibility (Winter, 16), by 
implying that anyone who spurns prevarication to such 
a degree could by no means be misrepresenting himself. 
At least some of the tension that existed in the 
beginning has been released, às Montaigne forswears 
self-deprecation in order to elaborate upon examples 
illustrating his ideas about liars. The final im-
pression we have of Montaigne is that of an almost 
superhuman persan who could never bring himself to 
tell a lie, even in order to protect himself from 
danger: "Certes, je ne m'assure pas que je pusse 
venir à bout de moi à garantir un danger évident et 
extrême par un effronté et solennel mensonge 11 (31). 
Ironically, in creating the illusion of modesty, 
and subsequently reversing it, Montaigne has done 
precisely what he has been accusing others of doing--
being hypocritical. 
Although written seven or eight years after 
"Des Menteurs," the essay entitled "De !'Institution 
des enfants" manif ests a remarkably similar process. 
Again the reader is bombarded at the beginning of 
the essay by self-deprecation, which is really the 
mask of a self-confident writer. Montaigne moves 
immediately from a generalization at the very 
beginning to a presumably modest, self-critical 
comment: "ce ne sont ici que rêveries d'homme qui 
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n'a goûté des sciences que la croûte premiere en son 
enfance, et n'en a retenu qu'un général et informe 
visage: un peu de chaque chose, et rien du tout, à la 
française" (7 2) . The accumulation of nega tians and 
caref ully chosen words expressing vagueness evokes 
an image of a dull, shallow mind which bas retained 
virtually nothing from bis education. However, the 
fact that this comment is preceded by "je vois, mieux 
que tout autre" neutralizes to a certain extent the 
negativity of the assessment, just as "en cette-là je 
pense être singulier et très rare" did in "Des Men-
teurs." The same sort of opposition may be identi-
fied in the following sentence, in which Montaigne 
begins with an affirmative "je sais qu'il y a . . . " 
and identifies specific examples of what he knows, 
but then adds, almost as if it were an afterthought, 
"et grossièrement à quoi elles visent" (72). The 
f act that the sentence concludes. wi th "à 1 'aventure 
encore sais-je . • . " (7 2) increases the ambiguity, 
because Montaigne is once again expressing "je sais"; 
however, the "à 1 1 aventure" that is tacked on weakens 
the affirmation and implies that what he knows, he 
knows only by chance. The element of chance plays 
an important role in this essay, functioning somewhat 
as nature did in "Des Menteurs" ("l'inconvénient 
naturel," "un défaut naturel"); both are convenient 
scapegoats for a writer who is not entirely serious 
about belittling himself. The rest of the paragraph 
pursues the development of the image of an ignorant, 
weak Montaigne, who is less knowledgeable than an 
"enfant des classes moyennes" (72) and who is "con-
traint assez ineptement de ... tirer quelque ma-
tière de propos universel" (72) from bis lessons. 
The addition of "si 1 1 on m'y force" implies that he 
would not do it unless he were forced, and even when 
forced he do es not do it well, but "ineptement." 
Montaigne's consistent use of indefinite expressions 
such as "quelque" and "quoi" throughout the para-
graph reinforces his claim that his knowledge is both 
vague and worthless. He bas successfully exploited 
all that he does not know, but has left untouched 
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exactly what he knows, holding his cards rather than 
playing them. 
The second paragraph begins with "Je ne" as did 
the first, and perseveres in sketching a negative 
self-portrait. As we have seen before, he flits back 
and forth from self-negation to self-affirmation. 
His comment "Je n'ai dressé commerce avec aucun livre 
solide," is reversed by "sinon Plutarque et Séneque," 
and f inally overturned again, f orming a circular mo-
tion, with "où je puise comme les Danaïdes, remplis-
sant et versant sans cesse" (7 2). Though he may put 
some of this clown on paper, he retains none of it 
himself. Montaigne depicts hirnself here as a rather 
selfless, passive vehicle for the transmission of 
knowledge, a man whose work may benefit others but 
not himself. It goes almost without saying that this 
essay, as well as nearly all the others, confirms 
that Montaigne is as well-versed in the writers of 
Antiquity as any other sixteenth-century humanist. 
His contention that he has retained nothing is bla-
tantly disproved by his adeptness a t presenting the 
ideas of the great philosophers as self-consciously 
and judiciously as he does. 
The other Montaigne, the proud one, who con--
stantly strives to reveal himself, becomes more overt 
at this point, breaking into the self-criticism in 
order to explain why he likes poetry "d'une parti-
culière inclination" ( 7 2) . In his comparison of 
poetry to sound in a trumpet, Montaigne reveals bath 
that he can be profoundly moved by literary language 
and that he himself is capable of translating his 
feelings into a powerful image. We are allowed to 
escape from Montaigne's subjective reality only 
momentarily, though, because he almost inunediately 
returns to it, criticizing his own judgment, which 
"ne marche qu'à tâtons, chancelant, bronchant et 
chopant • . . " (72). The use of the present par-
ticiple in this passage diffuses the image of f al-
tering over time, and thus reinf orces the idea of 
vagueness that Montaigne has so consistently 
attempted to establish. The same blurriness is 
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evoked in the description of Montaigne's visual 
acuity; be sees, "mais d'une vue trouble et en nuage, 
que je ne puis démêler" (7 2) . He would like us to 
believe here that bis life is spent groping about 
in a dense fog which obscures his perception. Mon-
taigne must have realized that emphasizing bis own 
ineptitude would also shield him from outside cri-
ticism. 
The reader cannot help but ask himself at some 
point why be should pay attention to someone so lack-
ing in self-esteem. After all, this is only Mon-
taigne 's "fantaisie" (73), and his text is witness to 
bis changeability. But it is precisely this perpetual 
weaving about between self-diminution and self-praise 
that keeps the reader on his guard. Montaigne's 
position is rarely so unambiguous that the reader 
would simply lose interest; there is always the 
sneaking suspicion that this writer, who creates 
illusions only to break them, does know what he is 
talking about, and that truth is being warped some-
what in the name of rhetoric. Iser discusses the 
play of understatement and hyperbole in fiction, 
explaining how 
elements of the repertoire are con-
tinually backgrounded or f oregrounded 
with a resultant strategic over-
magnification, trivialization, or 
even annihilation of the allusion, 
and how this affects the reader: "This defamiliar-
ization of what the reader thought he recognized is 
bound to create a tension that will intensify his 
expectations and bis distrust of those expectations" 
(Iser, 282). Though Montaigne may want us initially 
to see him as an obtuse individual, he makes sure 
that as the essay unfolds we are exposed to other 
facets of his character. The essays thrive on 
toying with our expectations. 
Montaigne is obviously proud, for example, that 
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he has treated subjects that have already been treated 
by the Ancients; i t happens "souvent" (elevation), but 
"il m'advient ... de fortune" (lowering), and in 
comparison to them he is "si faible et si chétif, si 
pesant et si endormi" (73). The repetition of "si" 
reinforces his case against himself. On the other 
band, he may_lag behind them, but at least, he adds, 
he is heading in their direction. We must admire 
that, and also the fact that he has "cela, que chacun 
n'a pas, de connaître l'extrême différence d'entre 
eux et moi" (73), an observation that we have already 
seen in this essay and in "Des Menteurs." And while 
his ideas may be "faibles et basses 11--which a t this 
point is bard to believe--he does have the courage 
to write them down "comme je les ai produites, sans 
en replâtrer et recoudre les défauts que cette com-
paraison m'y a découverts" (73). He may deny hiding 
his faults, but he cannot deny the fact that he is 
proud of his humility. His rather ostentatious con-
cluding sentence, "Il faut avoir les reins biert 
fermes pour entreprendre de marcher front à front 
avec ces gens-là" (73) may at first seem to be an 
honest assessment of how far removed from his idols 
he sees himself, but the way it is stated and the 
context in which it is found leaves open the pos-
sibili ty that he is attempting to walk abreast of 
them, if not indeed to surpass them. 
The third paragraph contains another example 
of Montaigne's expertise in creating images. After 
a lengthy criticism of "les écrivains indiscrets de 
notre siècle" who stuff their "ouvrages de néant" 
with passages from the Ancients, Montaigne changes 
key wi thout warning and des cribes how he happened 
upon--he would not want us to think that he were 
intelligent enough to have sought--a moving passage, 
au bout d'un long et ennuyeux chemin, 
... une pièce haute, riche et élevée 
jusques aux nues ••. c'était un pré-
cipice si droit et si coupé que 
je m'envolais en l'autre mond~; de là 
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je découvris la fondrière d'où je 
venais, si basse et si profonde que 
je n'eus onques plus le coeur de m'y 
ravaler. ( 73) 
The image is expanded so much and so poetically that 
the reader nearly forgets that Montaigne had been 
reprimanding indiscreet borrowing. Unlike the image 
of the trumpet at the beginning of this essay, which 
clarif ied his idea, this highly developed image man-
ages only to "l'envelopper, l'embrouiller, lui donner 
des dimensions de rêve. 1114 In a sense we, too, are 
elevated into "l'autre monde"; it is only once we are 
disengaged that we discover how tortuous the movement 
of the essay had become and how refined Montaigne's 
rhetoric can be, just as he suddenly discovers the 
dep ths to which the "paroles françaises . . . vides 
de matière et de sens" had led him. His "paroles 
françaises" here are as filled with emotion as the 
passage that he stumbled upon must have been. Here 
it is hard not to be impressed by the scope and 
plasticity of Montaigne's style. 
Perhaps unfortunately, Montaigne plunges us 
abruptly back into his subject. When he states that 
"Si j'étoffais l'un de mes dis cours de ces riches 
dépouilles, il éclairerait par trop la bêtise des 
autres" (73), he is at once implying that he does 
not "stuff" his works (because of the si clause 
construction with the imperfect) and that they are 
foolish in the first place. It is almost ludicrous 
to think that the writer of such a lyrical passage 
in the preceding paragraph could label his work 
"bêtise." The juxtaposition of the poet and the 
"deprecator" renders the cri ticism even less convin-
cing. As Peyre suggests, Montaigne "amorously po-
lished his own statue after having appeared to hammer 
all its pieces asunder" (Peyre, 3 7). 
One of the most noteworthy aspects of Mon-
taigne 's work is his adeptness at exploiting to the 
fullest extent the linguistic resources available 
to him. Language assists him on occasion in subtly 
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casting off the blame while appearing to blame him-
self. In stating "reprendre en autrui mes propres 
fautes ne me semble non plus incompatible que de re-
prendre, comme je fais souvent, celles d'autrui en 
moi" (73) he insulates himself from the faults; in 
the first clause he mentions "mes propres fautes," 
but they are "en autrui," not in himself. Likewise, 
in the second clausè, it is the faults of "autrui" 
which are in him: they are not intrinsically his. 
In any case, he cautions that "il .les faut accuser 
partout, et leur ôter tout lieu de franchise" (73). 
Personifying the faults allows him to be dogmatic 
without seeming to be; "il est dogmatique, mais para-
doxalement, car il l'est avec lyrisme" (Glauser, 
"L 'Education," p. 378). Statements using "il faut" 
and "que" with the subjunctive become more and more 
frequent as the essay progresses and as Montaigne 
situates himself more firmly on his authoritative 
pedestal. Now he says that he attempts "audacieuse-
ment," not occas ionally, but "à tous coups" to "m' é-
galer à mes larcins, d'aller pair à pair quant et 
eux" (73), a much different stance from that taken 
earlier when he staggered behind them. He also ex-
presses a timid desire to "tromper les yeux des juges 
à les discerner .•. " (73), which contradicts his 
previous statement disavowing any disguise that might 
highligh t the diff erence between his "inventions 
faibles et basses" and those of his paragon, the 
Ancients. 
Montaigne's consistent reversals seem to 
obliterate his portrait rather than elucidate it. In 
the same sentence he tears clown the positive image 
that he has just created by adding "mais c'est autant 
par le bénéfice de mon application que par le béné-
fice de mon invention et de ma force" (73). He now 
seems powerless and lethargic; his sentences overflow 
with negations: "je ne lutte point en gros ... ", 
"je ne m'y aheurte pas; je ne fais que les tâter; et 
ne vais point tant comme je marchande d'aller" (73) . 
Glauser's conclusion that 
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le sujet n'est pas tant alors Mon-
taigne que le personnage qu'il est 
en train de jouer: l'écrivain qui 
fait ses essais de 'honte.' Un moyen 
d'entrer dans l'oeuvre est de s'y 
présenter sous un jour défavorable 
qui engendre un jeu de contras tes" ( 40) 
seems especially appropriate here. By the end of the 
paragraph, Morttaigne has returned to h~s modest fa-
çade, implying that he is not an "honnête honune," 
nor can he "leur ... tenir palot" (73). It is 
ironie that Montaigne's theory of education pre-
scribes the formation of an "honnête homme," yet he 
claims not to be one himself. We must wonder about 
his expertise, as Glauser has: "Il nie le progrès, 
insiste sur l'ignorance, l'ineptie, la vanité de 
l'homme. C'est donc là le Montaigne qui va nous 
parler de pédagogie?" (Glauser, "L'Education," 376). 
The accusatory tone which was noted in "Des 
Menteurs" also cornes to the surf ace in this essay. 
Near the conclusion of this self-deprecatory intro-
duction, Montaigne once again returns to the subject 
of "les écrivains indiscrets" which he suspended 
earlier, indicting those whom he has discovered 
attempting to "se couvrir des armes d'autrui jusques 
à ne montrer pas seulement le bout de ses doigts 
..• " (73), calling it "injustice et lacheté" and 
charging them wi th trying to "se présenter par une 
valeur étrangère." We should include Montaigne in 
this category as well, since his entire self-por-
trait revolves around presenting himself by "valeurs 
étrangères." 
At the end of the paragraph Montaigne will 
clearly distinguish himself from the "commun" group 
of undiscriminating borrowers, stating, quite 
bluntly: "De ma part, il n'est rien que ne veuille 
moins faire" (73). By s tuffing the sentence with 
negations he forces the reader really to think about 
what the meaning is; a straightforward "Je ne le 
fais pas" would not "engage" us. The following 
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sentence could also be misleading; it begins with 
"je ne dis les autres," but continues with "sinon 
pour d'autant plus me dire." In other words, he bor-
rows the ideas of the Ancients only in order to clar-
ify his own position, which is undoubtedly much more 
important. His final comments in this paragraph about 
"centons" seem irrelevant and pretentious, and they 
demolish once and for all his earlier claim that he 
does not know books--now he takes pride in having 
seen "de très ingénieux en mon temps" (73). 
On the verge of a transition, Montaigne leans 
once again toward the attitude of his preface, dim-
inishing his artistic and judgmental capabilities and 
drowning his reader in a sea of inconclusiveness. 
However, he pref aces the def ensive s tatement "je n'ai 
pas délibéré de les cacher" with "Quoi qu'il en soit 
. . . et quelles que soient ses inepties," making us 
wonder why, if his def ects are as serious as he has 
led us to believe, he cannot seem to specify them 
now. The aim of this paragraph seems to be to revive 
the image of the honest, straightforward, imperfect 
Montaigne. Perhaps surprisingly, there are very few 
paradoxical statements here, probably due to the fact 
that he is about to embark upon the actual theory. 
This is, then, his final opportunity to denigrate 
himself before his dogmatic side cornes to the fore. 
Now he insists, as he did in the preface, that "ce 
sont ici mes humeurs et opinions; je les donne pour 
ce qui est en ma créance, non pour ce qui est à 
croire . . • " (73). His seemingly modest mission 
to "découvrir moi-même" even has a double-edged 
meaning; he does indeed wish to "discover" and un-
derstand himself, but he also wants to "uncover" his 
character before his public. He would not want us 
to think that he aimed to display his pedagogical 
knowledge, however; instead, he suggests in very 
vague terms that someone else persuaded him to do 
it: "Quelqu'un donc, . . me disait chez moi, 
l'autre jour, que je me devais être un peu étendu 
sur le discours de l'institution des enfants," 
(emphasis mine), even though he has no authority 
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to do so: " si j 'avais quelque suffisance en 
ce sujet • • • " (73). His ul terior motive is masked 
by what appears to be a generous, unselfish gesture 
toward "ce petit homme qui . • . menace de faire tan-
tôt une belle sortie . • • " (73). Montaigne then 
digresses into several personal comments addressed 
to Madame Diane de Foix, the mother of the "petit 
homme" to whom the essay is dedicated, all of which 
may have been appropriate, had she been the only 
reader he had in mind, but which seem irrelevant and 
even bothersome to anyone else. While it may have 
been a serious attempt on Morttaigne's part to in-
gratiate himself with Mme de Foix, it also seems 
possible that he is digressing in order t~ minimize 
the discrepancy between the self-deprecation at the 
beginning of the paragraph and the audacious postulate 
at the conclusion: "la plus grande difficulté et 
importante de l'humaine science semble être en cet 
endroit où il se traite de la nourriture et insti-
tution des enfants" (73). Should we believe him 
when he says "Je n'ai point l'autorité d'être cru"? 
He knows, and we will find out as we continue to 
read, that what he has to say is not only meaning-
ful in terms of the development of pedagogical theory, 
but perceptive as well. By now we should realize, on 
the other hand, that we cannot believe him, so in 
a rather twisted sense, he is being truthful. 
Now that he has emphasized the dif f iculty of 
the undertaking, he will proceed to systematically 
expose how he envisions the instruction of children, 
and perhaps of mankind in general as well, proposing 
solutions to the problems of preceptors, books, 
exercise, retention, and many others, and definitions 
for such delicate philosophical subjects as knowledge, 
judgment, and virtue. It is interesting that this 
is the part of "De l 'Institution des enfants" that 
is most often remembered and cited, perhaps because 
Montaigne's self-deprecation has mesmerized us. 
These are not, as we have said, the only 
essays that manif est heavy doses of self-deprecation. 
The structure as well as the content of the essay 
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entitled "Des Livres" bears an almost uncanny resem-
blance to those of "De l 'Institution des enfants," 
for example. Montaigne fills the first eight para-
graphs with such statements as "Je ne fais point de 
doute qu'il ne m'advienne souvent de parler de choses 
qui sont mieux traitées chez les maîtres du métier 
et plus véritablement" (171), "ce sont ici mes fan-
taisies, par lesquelles je ne tâche point à donner 
à connaître les choses, mais moi" (171), and "il 
faut musser ma faiblesse sous ces grands crédits" 
(171). As a matter of fact, up to the point at which 
Montaigne begins reviewing books, the.essay is little 
more than a recapitulation of the beginnings of the 
other two essays. A different technique is used in 
a later essay, "De la Présomption," in that self-
deprecation is scattered throughout the text rather 
than concentrated at the beginning. This may be due 
to the fact that Montaigne has obviously focused on 
himself as the subject of the essay; in fact, it 
seems to be the first essay that deals overtly with 
self-portraiture.15 And finally, even "L'Apologie 
de Raimond Sebond" express es the idea that Montaigne 
puts into practice in writing his essays: man must 
recognize "qu'il est infiniment loin de la sagesse 
de Dieu, il doit être humble, et c'est précisément 
en s'humiliant qu'il s'élève. 1116 
Many writers, bath before and af ter Montaigne, 
have tried to convince their reader that what they 
write is the truth and nothing but. At the begin-
ning of Le Père Goriot, for example, the Balzacian 
narrator insists that "ce drame n'est ni une fiction 
ni un roman. All is true, il est si véritable, que 
chacun peut en reconnaître les éléments chez soi, 
dans son coeur peut-être. 1117 Montaigne is no dif-
f erent. Bath writers are striving to reach the 
reader, to communicate with him, to touch his most 
sensitive nerve, and above all, to gain his trust. 
Montaigne desperately needs an audience; in 
fact, his work is dependent upon it to function. On 
the surface, the technique seems simple: Montaigne 
lowers himself in the eyes of the reader, the reader 
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Ls lulled into believing and will consequently accept 
the ideas and opinions that are about to be presented. 
If the reader delves below the surface, however, he 
will find that the method is much more complex. A 
close analysis of the self-deprecation in the essays 
treated in this study reveals the constant vacillation 
in Montaigne's point of view, in his self-concept, 
and in his attitude toward his reader. This can only 
genera te question af ter question about where Montaigne 
stands and what he actually believes. Superficially 
we may feel that we can trust him, and we may be im-
pressed by his ideas and think that we know him, but 
at a more profound level Montaigne slips through our 
f ingers. If i t is true tha t Montaigne tends to "pren-
dre la contrepartie d'une question" (Glauser, "L'Edu-
cation, 377), then perhaps we cannot even take him 
seriously when the self-deprecation has dwindled and 
the approach seems straightforward. If we let our-
selves be entrapped then perhaps his self-depreca-
tion has been successful. And even if we investi-
gate the text enough to suspect it, we still are left 
with nothing but fragments of a shattered self which 
Montaigne himself may have been unable to fit to-
gether. 
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